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Is the International Court of Justice Biased? 
Eric A. Posner and Miguel de Figueiredo1
December 13, 2004 
 
 
Abstract. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction over disputes between nations, and has 
decided dozens of cases since it began operations in 1946. Its defenders argue that the ICJ decides 
cases impartially and confers legitimacy on the international legal system. Its critics argue that the 
members of the ICJ vote the interests of the states that appoint them. Prior empirical scholarship is 
ambiguous. We test the charge of bias using statistical methods. We find strong evidence that (1) 
judges favor the states that appoint them, and (2) judges favor states whose wealth level is close to 
that of the judges’ own state; and weaker evidence that (3) judges favor states whose political 
system is similar to that of the judges’ own state, and (4) (more weakly) judges favor states whose 
culture (language and religion) is similar to that of the judges’ own state. We find weak or no 
evidence that judges are influenced by regional and military alignments. 
 
 
 The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations, and the only international court that has general subject matter jurisdiction over 
disputes between all of the members of the United Nations, virtually every state in the 
world.2  
 The ICJ has considerable importance, both political and scholarly. Many of the 
ICJ’s judgments appear to have resolved real international disputes. And although in 
many other cases states have failed to comply with its judgments, or to acknowledge its 
jurisdiction, the ICJ remains a potent symbol of the possibilities of an international legal 
system. For its defenders, the ICJ “plays the leading role in legitimating the [international 
legal] system by resolving its disputes in a principled manner.”3 Critics of the ICJ—
mainly politicians and diplomats from states that have recently lost their cases—argue 
                                                 
1 Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago, and Ph.D. student, Political Science, UC 
Berkeley. We thank Fay Booker, John de Figueiredo, Rui de Figueiredo, Jr., Sean Farhang, Andrew 
Guzman, Richard Hynes, Matt Jarvis, Anup Malani, Andrew Martin, Tom Miles, Simeon Nichter, Abdul 
Noury, Duncan Snidal, Laura Stoker, Greg Wawro, John Yoo, and participants at seminars at the 
University of Chicago, Washington University in St. Louis, and at the University of California Berkeley 
Law School for helpful comments, and Bill Martin and Wayne Hsiung for excellent research assistance. 
Posner thanks the Russell Baker Scholars Fund for financial support. 
2 The Court has two other functions as well: to provide advisory opinions to certain international 
organizations and to appoint arbitrators to other international tribunals; these functions are outside the 
scope of this paper. 
3 Franck (1995, 346). Franck describes criticisms of the ICJ as “remarkably toothless.” Id. 
that the ICJ’s rulings are politically motivated.4 In the words of Jeane Kirkpatrick, the ICJ 
is a “semi-legal, se etimes accept and 
sometimes don’t.”5
 The ICJ is also of intrinsic scholarly in ics, even those who 
do not study international law. It is, after all, a court, and resembles domestic courts in 
e United States and other countries. A large literature debates judicial voting in 
domest
applica
in the d
study o
domest
 s. We test the claim 
f the critics that the judges vote the interest of the state that appoints them rather than 
gally irrelevant considerations such as whether one party has a military alliance 
related to legally irrelevant factors. The null hypothesis implies that an unbiased judge 
mi-juridical, semi-political body which nations som
terest for legal academ
th
ic courts, focusing on whether judges’ decisions reflect ideology or disinterested 
tion of the conventions of legal reasoning.6 The academic discussion has a parallel 
ispute about whether the voting of ICJ judges reflects national interests or not. A 
f the voting patterns of ICJ judges might be of interest for those who study 
ic judicial decisionmaking. 
This paper examines data on the voting patterns of ICJ judge
o
enforcing international law in a disinterested way. The null hypothesis, then, is that 
judges are “unbiased.” A judge votes in an unbiased way if he or she is influenced only 
by the relevant legal considerations—such as the proper interpretation of a treaty—and 
not by le
with the judge’s state. The ideal way to determine whether a judge is unbiased, is just to 
figure out the proper legal outcome of a dispute and then see whether his or her vote 
matches that outcome, taking account legitimate differences in the legal cultures in which 
judges are educated. The problem with this approach, however, is that the proper legal 
outcome is rarely obvious, and, further, judges may make mistakes and vote the wrong 
way even though they are unbiased. 
 To avoid this problem, we can look at voting patterns alone and see if they are 
from state X is no more likely to vote for state X than is an unbiased judge from state Y. 
The unbiased judge from state X is also no more likely to vote for state Z, where Z is an 
ally of X, than an unbiased judge from state Y, where Z is an enemy of Y. We are thus 
                                                 
4 See also Robinson (2003). For some expressions of skepticism by international lawyers, see Reisman 
(1995), Chayes and Chayes (1995). 
5 See Freepedia, Nicaragua v. U.S., available at: http://en.freepedia.org/Nicaragua_v._United_States.html. 
6 See Segal & Spaeth (1993); Epstein & Knight (1998); Bergara et al. (2003). 
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not assuming that unbiased judges always vote the same way—as there can be legitimate, 
legally relevant grounds for disagreeing on the outcome of a dispute—but only that their 
disagreements are random (or correlated with relevant legal factors), and not correlated 
s to 85-90 percent when the party is the judge’s home 
ate. 
ing certain periods than do others, and that in rare 
viet and Syrian judges, they have always voted the 
                                                
with political factors. 
The simplest way to test this claim is to examine whether judges vote in favor of 
their home state when that state appears as a party. Previous studies have found some 
support for this claim, but have also disputed the significance of this finding.7 We use 
more sophisticated empirical tests, as well as more data, to show that, in fact, judges are 
significantly biased in favor of their home state when that state appears as a party. 
Whereas judges vote in favor of a party about 50 percent of the time when they have no 
relationship with it, that figure rise
st
 This finding has limited importance, however, because it does not tell us anything 
about the voting behavior of judges when their home state is not a party. It is possible that 
only the judges whose home states are parties are biased, in which case their votes cancel 
out, leaving 13 or so other judges to resolve the case impartially. We hypothesize that 
even when a judge’s home state is not a party, his home state may have an interest in one 
party prevailing, and that the judge’s vote will reflect his state’s interest. Previous studies 
have found no evidence for this hypothesis. The most recent such study concluded: 
 
[T]he record does not reveal significant [voting] alignments, either on a regional, 
political, or economic basis. There is a high degree of consensus among the 
judges on most decisions. The most that can be discerned is that some judges vote 
more frequently together dur
instances, notably with the So
same way. But there have not been persistent voting alignments which have 
significantly affected the decisions of the Court. (Weiss 1987, 134) 
 
However, this study and the earlier studies all have flaws; chiefly, the failure to rely on 
statistical techniques that control for relevant factors. 
 
o “not support the theoretical contention that the system of national 
 
7 For example, Suh (1969, 230) found that judges vote in favor of their government in 82 percent of the 
cases, but concluded that his data d
judges must necessarily be out of harmony with international justice.” See also Hensley (1968); Samore
(1956); Weiss (1987). 
4 
To test our hypothesis, we classify states into blocs—based on region, wealth, 
culture, military and political alliances, and similar factors—so that we can determine 
whether judges are biased in favor of state parties that belong to the same bloc as the 
judges’ home state. We find substantial evidence for this hypothesis. 
 
rly 1930s issued about two judgments on contentious cases per year. However, it 
The ICJ is based on the statute of the International Court of Justice, which is 
indepen
Nations
foundin
docume
ourt o
submit their case to the court; (ii) 
cases authorized by a treaty that provides that future disputes arising under the treaty will 
be adjudicated by the ICJ; and (iii) cases between states that have declared themselves 
The paper proceeds as follows. Part I provides some background, including the 
history of the ICJ and a brief discussion of the political and academic debates about the 
ICJ. Part II provides our hypotheses. Part III describes the data and tests the hypotheses. 
 
I. Background 
 
 The ICJ is not the first world court; it is the successor of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. The PCIJ began operations in 1922, and at its peak in the late 1920s 
and ea
gradually lost relevance for governments beset by the problems created by the worldwide 
depression and the rise of fascism. By the late 1930s the PCIJ, like the League of 
Nations, had become irrelevant and it was not used at all during World War II. 
 The founders of the United Nations resurrected the PCIJ, albeit with a new name, 
in the hope that a world court would operate more successfully if backed by the United 
Nations, which was designed to be a stronger institution than the League of Nations and 
enjoyed the participation and leadership of the United States. 
 
dent of, but referenced by, the United Nations charter. All members of the United 
 charter are parties to the statute, so virtually every state has been, from the ICJ’s 
g, subject to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. The statute of the ICJ is a vague 
nt, and has been supplemented over the years with other agreements, internal 
rders, and customs. c
 The ICJ has jurisdiction over three types of cases: (i) cases by “special 
agreement,” where the parties to a dispute agree to 
subject to the “compulsory jurisdiction” of the court. Sixty-four states have accepted the 
5 
compul
 third (not counting 
tirem
 
en voted on by the security council and the general assembly. If a state appears before 
rty, and a national from that state is not currently a judge, the state may 
land)—5; 
rmany, Japan, and Canada 
e mo
upporters and the efforts of states to limit their international 
sory jurisdiction of the court, albeit frequently with reservations, and numerous 
multilateral treaties provide for ICJ adjudication. 
 Fifteen judges sit on the ICJ. Each judge has a nine year, renewable term. Their 
terms are staggered, so that the composition of the court shifts by one
re ents and deaths) every three years. No two judges may share a nationality. Judges 
must have the standard qualifications, and typically they have significant experience as 
lawyers, academics, diplomats, or domestic judges. Judges are nominated by states, and
th
the court as a pa
appoint an ad hoc judge who serves only for that case but otherwise has the same powers 
as the permanent judges. 
If there are fifteen slots but 191 states (by the end of our period), how are the 
states that receive representation determined? The slots are distributed by region, 
currently as follows: Africa—3; Latin America—2; Asia—3; Western Europe and 
“other” states (including Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zea
Eastern Europe (including Russia)—2. This distribution is the same as that of the security 
council, and the permanent members of the security council have, by custom, one slot 
each.8 Thus, the U.S., Russia, Britain, and France nearly always have a judge on the 
court;9 other states rotate. Larger and wealthier states like Ge
ar re likely to have representation than smaller states. Many smaller states—Austria, 
Bulgaria, Finland, and Turkey, for example—have never had representation. There have 
been 90 judges so far. They have served an average term of about 9 years. In 79 
proceedings, one or both of the parties used an ad hoc judge. 
 The history of the ICJ can be seen as a struggle between the internationalist 
aspirations of the court’s s
                                                 
8 The distribution is not formally recorded, but is the custom (Rosenne (1995)). There is no official list of 
the countries in each region, which is a problem for our coding, especially as this ambiguity is sometimes 
exploited: 
In 1999, for example, Jordan was suddenly considered as an Asian country while it had been 
considered as an African country until then. Judge Al-Khasawneh from Jordan was accordingly 
able to succeed Judge Weeramantry from Sri Lanka. 
Email from Laurence Blairon, Information Officer for the International Court of Justice, to Wayne Hsiung 
(July 12, 2004). 
9 China did not have a judge from 1967 to1985. 
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obligations. Consider the bases of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction by special agreement poses no 
threat to states because they can avoid it simply by refusing to consent to jurisdiction. 
 of the benefits of the treaty, and, as ICJ jurisdiction is always 
recipro
gua case (discussed below), 
permanent member of the security council remains subject to compulsory jurisdiction 
were d
The ICJ, in special agreement cases, serves as an elaborate arbitration device. To be sure, 
unlike traditional arbitration, the state parties that use the ICJ do not select most of the 
judges, so that the ICJ, unlike traditional arbitration panels, may be willing to decide 
cases in a way that reflects the interests of states other than the two parties. But for just 
this reason states may use traditional arbitration rather than the ICJ, if they wish. 
 Next we have treaty-based jurisdiction. Here, state consent is also needed—at the 
time that the treaty is ratified—so in theory states have nothing to fear from treaty-based 
jurisdiction. But in practice states sometimes must agree to ICJ resolution of treaty 
disputes if they want any
cal, states agree to ICJ jurisdiction so that they have the power to bring other states 
to court. These states can then find themselves pulled before the ICJ against their will, 
often many years after the treaty was ratified. 
 Finally, we have compulsory jurisdiction. Again, states can avoid compulsory 
jurisdiction by not filing a declaration. But many states have filed this declaration, 
apparently because they believe the benefit—being able to pull another state before the 
ICJ—exceeds the costs—being pulled before the ICJ by another state. Note that the 
obligation is strictly reciprocal: a state can be pulled before the ICJ only by another state 
that has itself filed the declaration. In addition, most states have, through reservations, 
consented to compulsory jurisdiction only for a narrow range of cases. The US’s 
declaration, for example, excluded cases involving national security. When the ICJ 
nonetheless found that this clause was satisfied in the Nicara
the U.S. pulled out of compulsory jurisdiction. France also withdrew from compulsory 
jurisdiction after the ICJ took a case without France’s consent in the early 1970s. No 
except the UK. 
  One hundred and four cases have been filed with the ICJ; about a quarter of these 
ropped before the ICJ was able to make a substantive decision. In 76 cases, the ICJ 
7 
judges voted on substantive questions.10 The most common type of case involved a 
border dispute (31), followed by use of force (22), property (14), and aerial incident 
(14).11 A few examples follow. 
  
 Corfu Channel (1947-1949). This case was the ICJ’s first contentious case. In 
1946 British warships struck mines in Albanian waters and were damaged. The United 
Kingdom filed an application with the ICJ, charging that Albania was responsible either 
w other cases in which the U.S. or other 
for laying the mines or for not clearing them. The ICJ held Albania violated international 
law, and awarded Britain damages of ₤844,000. The Albanian government refused to pay 
and a settlement was not reached until 1992.12
 
 Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of the United States of America 
(1954). This case is the first between the two superpowers; it also disappeared because 
the Soviet Union refused to participate. A fe
western powers filed applications against the Soviet Union or its satellites also never 
advanced beyond preliminary stages. The Soviet Union and its satellites have never filed 
applications. For the most part, the ICJ was used during the cold war (and after) only by 
western powers and developing countries. 
 
 The Temple of Preah Vihear (1962). The case was one of many border disputes 
arising from decolonization. Cambodia filed an application against Thailand, 
complaining that Thailand illegally occupied Cambodian territory around the Temple of 
Preah Vihear. The ICJ ruled in favor of Cambodia. Thailand accepted the judgment and 
relinquished its claim. 
 
                                                 
10 In our data analysis, we consider only these 76 cases and ignore the others. The majority of the 28 
remaining cases co
not reveal much ab
nsist of pending cases or of rulings on administrative and procedural matters, which do 
out the ideological decision making of judges. In addition, we also have some cases that 
proceedings. 
11 Ginsburg & McAdams (2004). Our numbers a slightly different from theirs because we count cases in a 
different way. 
12 Rosenne (1995, 44). 
were dropped prior to a merits decision. Note also that a case may have several of what we classify as 
“proceedings,” that is, an opportunity for the judges to vote. Most cases have one (a ruling on preliminary 
objections) or two (a ruling also on the merits); a few have three (an interpretive ruling or a ruling on 
remedy or a ruling on a request for provisional measures). On average, each case had a bit less than two 
8 
 South West Africa (1966). South Africa controlled neighboring territory (now 
Namibia), claiming the right under a League of Nations Mandate. Ethiopia, Liberia, and 
many other African countries objected to South Africa’s control and its policies, and, 
ter political efforts failed, filed an application with the ICJ. The ICJ took jurisdiction 
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (1979-1981). The U.S. 
nista government. The CIA mined Nicaraguan 
orts and harbors in a secret operation; when Nicaragua found out, it filed an application 
hdrew its consent to compulsory jurisdiction. 
Breard (1998). Paraguay brought proceedings that challenged the United States’ 
af
over the application on a close vote, but then subsequently (after a change in the bench) 
ruled that it did not have jurisdiction. The case is significant because the outcome 
outraged the newly powerful bloc of former colonial countries, which resolved to boycott 
the ICJ.13 The court repudiated its reasoning in a later case, an event likened to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s repudiation of the jurisprudence of Lochner.14
 
 
filed an application against Iran after the Iranian government permitted militants to seize 
the American embassy and take members of the embassy staff hostage. The ICJ ruled in 
favor of the U.S. but the ruling did not appear to have any influence on Iran, which 
refused to participate in proceedings. 
 
 Nicaragua (1984). The U.S. had been supporting insurgents in Nicaragua, which 
was controlled by the Soviet backed Sandi
p
in the ICJ, claiming that the U.S. had violated various treaties as well as general 
principles of international law. The U.S. argued that the ICJ did not have jurisdiction 
because (i) the treaties did not confer jurisdiction on the ICJ, and (ii) compulsory 
jurisdiction did not apply. When the ICJ held against the U.S., the U.S. refused to comply 
with the ruling, and wit
 
 
failure to advise a Paraguayan national of his rights under the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations at the time of his arrest. The ICJ tried to stop the U.S. from executing 
the Paraguayan national, but the U.S. refused to obey the ICJ’s order. The U.S. lost two 
                                                 
13 See McWhinney (1991, 158). 
entation of the New Deal; it was repudiated in 1937, possibly as a result of concerns about 
g plan, and New Deal legislation was allowed to proceed. 
14 The Namibia (1971) advisory opinion. Lochner era jurisprudence favored property rights and interfered 
with the implem
Roosevelt’s court packin
9 
subsequent cases (LaGrand (1999), brought by Germany; Avena (2004), brought by 
Mexico) on similar facts, and in both those cases also refused to obey the ICJ’s orders. 
 
 Legality of Use of Force (1999). Yugoslavia filed ten applications against the ten 
NATO states that participated in the military intervention in Kosovo. Two of these 
applications were dismissed; the others are pending. 
 
 Figure 1 shows the size of the ICJ’s docket, by decade. The docket declined in the 
1960s and 1970s and recovered somewhat in the late 1980s and 1990s. The reasons for 
ese changes are complex. In part, the number of states increased; but at the same time, th
the court seems to have become less popular among the major western states.15
 
Figure 1: Usage of ICJ: Filings 
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 As the number of UN members has tripled over this period, it seems clear that the 
ICJ has become less popular, but it is not clear why.16
 
 
 
004). Part of the spike in the late 1990s is a result of Serbia’s filing of 10 15 For a discussion, see Posner (2
separate cases against the members of NATO. The cases all involved the use of force against Yugoslavia 
by the NATO powers.  
16 For some speculation, see Posner (2004). 
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II. Hypothesis 
 
 Scholars have proposed a range of motives for judges of domestic courts: they 
ay seek to maximize their wealth, their status, their leisure, attainment of their political 
hat judicial votes are correlated with 
y, or via 
lection effects. 
 Psychologically, if judges identify with their countries, they may find it difficult 
to maintain impartiality. ICJ judges are not only nationals who would normally have 
strong emotional ties with their country; they also have spent their careers in national 
service as diplomats, legal advisors, administrators, and politicians.18 Even with the best 
intentions, they may have trouble seeing the dispute from the perspective of any country 
but that of their native land. National and linguistic differences may also interfere with 
the establishment of collegiality on the court. 
 Economically, judges may be motivated by material incentives. Judges who defy 
the will of their government by holding against it may be penalized. The government may 
refuse to support them for reappointment, and also refuse to give them any other 
desirable government position after the expiration of their term. These considerations are 
likely to weigh even more heavily in the calculations of judges from authoritarian states, 
as these judges do not necessarily have the option to take refuge in the private sector if 
e governments choose the judges, 
ey can ensure that their judges are not too independent-minded by drawing from the 
m
goals, or the probability of elevation or other future position. They also may seek 
sincerely to rule in the manner dictated by law. Empirical studies so far have been 
suggestive but inconclusive. Numerous studies find t
the ideology or party affiliation of the judge, but these studies are vulnerable to 
methodological objections.17
 The international setting adds a new factor: national identity. National identity 
could affect decisionmaking in three ways: psychologically, economicall
se
they displease their government. 
 The selection effect works as follows. Becaus
th
                                                 
17 See supra note __. 
he ICJ Yearbooks (1947-2004). Some of the judges were former professors, albeit 
rnational legal affairs on behalf of their country. 
18 See the biographies of the current court at 
 http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icvjudge/tomka.htm. Biographies of members of earlier 
courts can be found in t
ones who have been heavily involved in inte
11 
pool of officials who have shown reliability and the appropriate attitudes. There is 
19
itted to the development of international law, or think that 
ICJ judges vote in favor of the country that 
ties. We expect that their votes will cancel 
evidence that the appointment of judges is a highly political process.  States may try to 
appoint judges who are already inclined to advance the national interest.  
 It is not the purpose of this paper to decide which of these explanations, if any, are 
true.20 We are concerned with the question whether these factors or some other factors 
cause judges to vote in favor of the interests of the state that appoints them.21 The 
contrary view—the null hypothesis—is that judges take their legal role seriously because 
they are ideologically comm
they are more likely to be rewarded for impartiality than for bias, or are not selected on 
the basis of national bias. 
The simplest hypothesis is that 
appointed them when that country is a party to the case. Thus, if the applicant is the U.S., 
and the judge is an American, then the judge will vote in favor of the applicant. If the 
respondent is Nigeria, and the judge is an ad hoc appointee of Nigeria (whether he or she 
is Nigerian or not), then the judge will vote in favor of the respondent. 
 This first hypothesis is simple and easily tested, but it does not resolve the main 
question, which is whether the ICJ, as a court, is biased. For the normal two party case, 
only two of the judges are nationals of the par
each other out, and the question is, what about the other judges? Regarding these judges, 
we hypothesize that they will vote in favor of the state party whose strategic interest is 
more closely aligned with the strategic interest of the judge’s home state. We examine 
several such alignments: 
                                                 
19 See Rosenne (1995). 
20 Our data set is not rich enough to allow us to do this; for some speculation about these issues, see Posner 
(2004). 
21 The literature on domestic courts makes 
naïve judge votes his ideology, and a
a distinction between naïve and sophisticated voting – where a 
 sophisticated judge takes account of the possible responses of 
attitudes of other states or international organizations. Thus, the judges are sophisticated, but their 
incentives are national, not international. Future research might consider the possibility that judges seek to 
ate the court, and for that reason would sometimes vote against the interests of their 
ropean Court of Justice (see Alter 1998, Gibson & Caldeira 
Congress and so may suppress his ideological instincts when doing so would elicit a negative reaction from 
Congress. We do not take into account the possibility that states or international institutions might respond 
to ICJ judgments by overturning them or ignoring them, though the latter does happen. Our working 
hypothesis is that judges care more about their own government’s and state’s attitudes toward them than the 
strengthen and legitim
own states. A stream of literature on the Eu
1995) argues that judges of the ECJ vote impartially in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the court. 
Unfortunately, ECJ votes are not public, so we cannot test this hypothesis using the method advanced in 
this paper. 
12 
 1. Region. UN General Assembly voting often divides along regional lines, and 
the ICJ has region-based representation. Accordingly, we predict regional alignments. 
We will focus on continental alignments (North America, South America, Africa, 
r trade. Thus, we predict that judges from wealthier countries 
will fav
interests, and are 
ore l
ith the same language and religion as the judge’s home state. 
riables might, in fact, be better proxies for political alignments, 
Europe, Asia).22
 
 2. Military. We predict that NATO states and states within the Soviet sphere of 
influence voted as blocs during the cold war (before 1989). 
 
 3. Wealth. Wealthier and poorer countries often form blocs in international 
conflicts, for example, ove
or wealthier parties, and that judges from poor countries will favor poorer parties. 
States may also support members of trade alliances or organizations such as the EU and 
the OECD. 
 
 4. Democracy. Many scholars argue that democracies share 
m ikely to cooperate in international relations.23 We thus test the hypothesis that 
judges from democracies are more likely to favor democracies; we also look at whether 
judges from nondemocracies are more likely to favor nondemocracies. 
 
 5. Culture. Judges might be biased in favor of states for which they have a cultural 
affinity. As proxies for culture, we use majority language and religion: judges are more 
likely to vote for states w
Note that these va
especially postcolonial alignments. 
 
 6. UN organization. We look at whether judges from states that are permanent 
members of the security council are more likely to vote for permanent members of the 
security council. 
 
                                                 
22 The regional representation on the ICJ is not quite the same, but alternative coding does not produce 
results that are appreciably different. 
23 For examples, see Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999); Lipson (2003); Lake (1992); and Schweller (1992). 
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III. Data 
 
A. Approach 
 
The case reports include a majority opinion, plus concurring and dissenting 
pinions when they exist. The reports also show a vote tally for each issue that is decided. 
sue by reading all the opinions. Later reports give the vote tally and also reveal the way 
e test asks whether a judge voted in favor of an applicant or a respondent for 
 particular issue. We used both approaches, but only report our analysis and results for 
25
Vcj = β1 + β2i[applicant-judge nationality match] + β3i[respondent-judge 
atch] + β14i[language interaction term (β12i x β13i)] 
o
Earlier reports showed only the vote tally, and not the identities of the judges who voted 
each way, but one can usually (though not always) determine each judge’s vote on each 
is
each judge voted. Thus, one can determine how every judge votes on nearly every issue 
in every case. 
As a result, we can test our hypotheses in two ways. The case-by-case test asks 
whether a judge voted in favor of an applicant or respondent in a particular case.24 The 
issue-by-issu
a
the case-by-case approach.
Let Vcj = 1 if the vote (V) by a particular judge (j) from a particular state is in 
favor of the applicant in a particular case (c); otherwise Vcj = 0. The regression equation 
is: 
nationality match] + β4i[applicant-judge region match] + β5i[respondent-judge region 
match] + β6i[region interaction term (β4i x β5i)] + β7i[applicant-judge NATO match] + 
β8i[respondent-judge NATO match] + β9i[NATO interaction term (β7i x β8i)] + 
β10i[democracy measure] + β11i[wealth measure] + β12i[applicant-judge language match] 
+ β13i[respondent-judge language m
                                                 
24 Note t
t rather than as a respondent. 
ilar. The advantage of the issue-by-issue approach is that there are more data. A single 
se may have as many as 10 issues, and the judges may vote differently by issue. The problem with the 
ounts each issue equally. But a judge who votes in favor of the applicant 
on nine jurisdictional issues, and in favor of the respondent on one jurisdictional issue, is, as a practical 
se where he votes in favor of the applicant on the first of two issues 
hat the special agreement cases do not technically involve an applicant and respondent, because 
they are brought jointly by the two parties. In these cases, the words “applicant” and “respondent” are just 
placeholders and should be read as “one party or the other.” Nothing in the analysis turns on the identity of 
a party as an applican
25 The results are sim
ca
issue-by-issue approach is that it c
matter, voting against the applicant. It is not clear that such a judge should be considered predominantly 
pro-applicant, or more so than in a ca
and the respondent on the second. 
14 
β15i[applicant-judge religion match] + β16i[respondent-judge religion match] + 
teraction term (β15i x β16i)] + ui
The first variable—applicant-judge nationality match—is a dummy variable 
equal to
e look at bloc voting. NATO applicant match equals 1 if the applicant is a 
NATO
 country, or it is and the judge does not come from a NATO 
country
n a NATO country is an applicant, its own judge is a nationality applicant match as 
well as
In the case of democracy and wealth, we can use a single variable for each. The 
27
β17i[religion in
 1 if the applicant state and the judge’s state are the same; otherwise the variable 
equals zero. Respondent-judge nationality match equals 1 if the respondent state and the 
judge’s state are the same. For example, if the case is U.S. v. Iran, then for the 
observation containing the U.S. judge, applicant match equals 1 and respondent match 
equals 0. For the observation containing the Iranian judge, the reverse is true. For the 
observations containing other judges, both variables equal 0. 
Next, w
 country and the judge comes from a NATO country. The variable equals 0 if the 
applicant is not a NATO country, or it is and the judge does not come from a NATO 
country. Similarly, NATO respondent match equals 1 if the respondent is a NATO 
country and the judge comes from a NATO country. The variable equals 0 if the 
respondent is not a NATO
. We use a separate interaction variable to capture cases where the applicant, the 
respondent, and the judge are from NATO, in which case we predict no bias. Note that 
whe
 a NATO match. The national applicant match variable serves as a control in cases 
such as this. 
 These principles guide our tests of the other alliances and regional groups, 
including region, the OECD, EU, and Warsaw Pact;26 and also of language and religion. 
The language and religion match variables equal 1 if the applicant (or respondent) has the 
same majority language or religion as the judge’s home state; 0 otherwise. 
formula for the democracy measure is: |(judge’s state’s democracy score—respondent’s 
democracy score)| - |(judge’s state’s democracy score—applicant’s democracy score)|, 
here the democracy score ranges fromw  0 (authoritarian) to 10 (democracy).  The 
                                                 
26 We eventually decided not to include these variables in the reported regressions because of 
multicollinearity problems; but we provide some data related to them below. 
27 We also test the democracy level in a dichotomous fashion, following the international relations 
literature. 
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formula for the wealth measure is: |(judge’s state’s logged per capita GDP—respondent’s 
logged per capita GDP)| - |(judge’s state’s logged per capita GDP—applicant’s state’s 
logged 
st important, we use fixed 
effects 
en though the individual judges are unbiased. Because we are interested in 
 
results will exaggerate the extent of the bias. However, we do not think that this is a 
per capita GDP)|. In each case, the variable takes a positive value when the 
judge’s state and the applicant state are similar along the relevant dimension, and the 
respondent state’s is different. The variable takes a negative value when the judge’s state 
and the applicant are different, and the judge’s state is closer to the respondent. 
 Finally, we use some controls, including controls for type of case (border dispute, 
use of force, and so forth), type of jurisdiction, the existence of multiple applicants or 
respondents, the existence of interveners, and so forth.28 Mo
for cases and judges, in order to ensure that case-specific and judge-specific 
factors do not bias the results.29 Suppose, for example, that bloc voting occurs only in 
hard cases or cases with certain attributes such as geopolitical salience, and does not 
occur in other cases. If we don’t control for case-specific effects, our results will be 
inflated. A similar point can be made about judge-specific factors. 
 Before we turn to the data, we should discuss selection effects. We already 
mentioned one kind of selection effect: governments might appoint judges who are 
impartial—in the sense that they vote according to legal principles—but happen to hold 
an idiosyncratic view of the world that favors the legal principles that will end up helping 
the appointing state in any ICJ litigation. On this view, the ICJ may be biased as an 
institution ev
the institution as a whole, and less interested in the motivations of the judges, this 
selection effect does not undermine our empirical analysis. We do note, however, that it 
is unlikely that jurisprudence could be so elastic that a judge could always vote in good 
faith in favor of his own country. 
A more troublesome possible selection effect could occur at the filing stage rather 
than the appointment stage. Suppose that states file cases with the ICJ only when they 
predict that the judges will favor them. As a result, the pool of observations does not 
contain those cases where (say) a judge votes against his home state, and our regression 
                                                 
28 We do not report regressions using these controls either because they make no difference or because they 
1993, 466-469). 
eliminate too many degrees of freedom. 
29 Greene (
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serious problem. Respondents do not have any control over whether they will be pulled 
into court, so there ought to be no selection bias with respect to judges whose home states 
are respondents. Yet judges who are nationals of respondents vote in favor of respondents 
at roughly the same rate that judges who are nationals of applicants vote in favor of their 
home state.30
A final type of selection bias is related to the type of cases that the ICJ is hearing. 
monstrate only bias in 
. Who
                                                
Suppose that states tend to settle easy cases and litigate hard cases, with the result that 
only hard cases make it into our data set. It is possible that the ICJ judges would resolve 
the easy cases in an impartial way (and thus the cases are settled against the expectation 
of impartial adjudication), and their biases affect results only when the proper legal 
outcome is ambiguous. If so, then our results may exaggerate the overall bias of the ICJ. 
This problem is more troubling than the others. To address it properly, we would 
need to have data about the entire universe of cases where the possibility of litigation in 
the ICJ existed. This is clearly impossible, and thus our results de
the cases that actually reach judgment. We should note, however, that it seems unlikely 
that governments would believe that the ICJ would resolve easy cases impartially if it 
doesn’t appear to resolve hard cases impartially. If governments observe that hard cases 
are being resolved in a biased fashion, then one would expect that some government 
would find it in its interest to try bringing a somewhat easier case to the ICJ when it 
expects that the ICJ judges would be heavily biased in the government’s favor, as would 
sometimes be the case. If the ICJ resolves cases like these impartially, then this would be 
reflected in our results; if not, then there is no reason to doubt our results. 
 
B. Description of Data 
 
1  Litigates? 
 
Although ICJ judges come from all regions, litigants do not. The main litigants 
have been the United States (21 cases), Britain (15), France (11), German (7), Belgium 
(5), Iran (5), India (4), Spain (4), Australia (4), and the Netherlands (4). Two thirds of 
 
tches than for respondent matches, suggesting that this selection 
nt. 
30 We do find that for some variables (language, religion), the coefficients and level of statistical 
significance are higher for applicant ma
effect may exist to some exte
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states have never appeared before the ICJ, including China, Japan, Russia/USSR, South 
Korea, Brazil, Argentina, and Poland. During the Cold War, no Soviet satellite appeared 
before the ICJ. And, until recently, most cases have pitted Western nations against each 
other, or else developing countries against each other. Thus, it is immediately clear that 
we are unlikely to have enough variation to test our hypothesis that general regional and 
military
 
judges 
 alignments predict voting patterns. 
 
2. Party Judges 
 
 By “party judges,” we mean (1) judges who are nationals of one of the state 
parties; and (2) ad hoc judges appointed by one of the state parties because it does not 
have a national already on the court. Several earlier studies investigate whether party
are biased. Most of these studies have concluded that they are somewhat but not 
very biased, based on an issue by issue comparison of their votes to the votes of nonparty 
judges.31 Table 1 provides our data. 
 
Table 1: Votes of Party and Nonparty Judges in Proceedings 
Judge Vote in Favor of Applicant Vote in Favor of Respondent 
 Ratio Percentage Ratio Percentage 
Party—National 15/18 83.3 34/38 89.5 
Party—Ad Hoc 57/63 90.5 37/41 90.2 
Party—Total 72/81 88.9 71/79 89.9 
Nonparty 656/1356 48.4 638/1358 47.032
 
Judges favor their home state. They vote for non-home parties 47 to 48 percent of the 
me; they vote for home states about 90 percent of the time. 
bstantial evidence that party judges vote in favor of their home 
 votes of party judges may cancel each other out, and it is possible that 
e nonparty judges are unbiased, and therefore the ICJ as a whole renders impartial 
decisio
 
                                                
ti
 There is thus su
state. However, the
th
ns. 
 
 
 
iple litigants in a case. 
31 See Weiss (1987). 
32 Percentages do not add up to 100 either because of decisions that do not clearly favor the applicant or 
respondent, missing data, or mult
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3. Nonparty Judges 
 
 We attempt to measure the biases of nonparty judges by looking for links between 
their state and the state parties. We hypothesize that nonparty judges are more likely to 
vote in favor of states that belong to a geopolitical bloc shared by their own state. Table 2 
reports results for voting by bloc or alignment. 
 
Table 2: Bloc Voting When Judge’s State Is Not a Party 
Judge-Applicant Judge- t Test of  Match Respondent Match Difference 
Region 0.38 86 
0.38 
66 0.06 
NATO 0.52 44 
0.36 
139 1.93 
EU 0.43 28 
0.23 
48 1.84 
OECD 0.60 10
0.28 
 148 2.18 
Security council 0.54 31 
0.57 
79 0.20 
Langu 103 age 
0.75 0.41 4.81 76 
Reli n 149 
0.37 
147 5.gio
0.66 07 
No match 0.54 699 
All observations 0.50 1194 
Not de percent es for appli  a judge from e that matc he applicant 
g state that the nonmatching state. For example, judges vote for the applicant 
0 percent of the time when the judge’s state and the applicant are members of OECD 
nd the respondent is not), and judges vote for the applicant 28 percent of the time when 
the judge’s state and the respondent are members of the OECD (and the applicant is not). 
e: cells provi age of vot cant by  a stat hes t
or respondent along the relevant dimension, and number of observations. We exclude cases where the 
applicant and the respondent share the characteristic in question (except in the last row), and cases where 
the judge’s home state is a party (or the judge is an ad hoc). 
 
 
 The table provides support for the hypothesis of bloc voting. When the judge’s 
state and one party match—both are members of NATO, EU, OECD, or they share 
language or religion—and the other party does not, the judge is more likely to vote for 
the matchin
6
(a
These results are especially strong for language and religion. Regional alignments and 
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security council membership seem to be irrelevant, however. The last two rows provide a 
ge of votes for the applicant when the 
pplicant and the judge both belong to the EU is less than 50 percent, but this may be 
attributable to fa
 Figure 2 shows the relationship between w ent and the probability of a 
judge favoring the applicant.33 -axis show probabil ng for the 
applicant. The x-axis shows the extent of the match between the wealth of the judge’s 
state and the wealth of the applicant: 5 means that the judge’s state and the applicant have 
high GD while the responden s a low GD  that the jud  state and the 
applicant have low GDPs while the respondent has a high GDP. Lower numbers mean 
that the judge’s state’s GDP is closer to the respondent’s (whether high or low) and 
farther fr nt’s. In sho higher values m  that the judg ate is closer to 
the applicant’s; lower values mean that the judge’s state is closer to the respondent’s. The 
observati ivided evenly a  each value o  x-axis (abou  per value). 
 
basis for comparison. They show that for observations in which the judge does not match 
with either state along any of these dimensions, and for all observations (except when the 
judge’s home state is a party), the percentage of votes for the applicant is around 50, as 
one would expect. It is odd that the percenta
a
ctors not controlled for. 
ealth alignm
s the  The y ity of voti
Ps t ha P, or ge’s
om the applica rt, ean e’s st
ons are d mong n the t 120
                                                 
33 We used purchasing power parity-adjusted GDP figures; see Heston et al. (2002); available at: 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php. 
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Figure 2: Relationship Between Judges’ Votes and Matching Economies 
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Figure 2 shows the predicted relationship. A judge is more likely to vote in favor of 
wealthy states (per capita GDP) when the judge’s state is wealthy, than when the judge’s 
state is poor. A judge is more likely to vote in favor of a poor state when the judge’s state 
is poor, than when the judge’s state is wealthy. 
 Figure 3 shows a similar relationship between regime type and the likelihood of a 
judge favoring the applicant. A low value on the x-axis means that the democracy score 
for the judge’s state (whether high or low) is close to the democracy score of the 
respondent.34 Again, the observations are divided evenly among values (about 182 per 
value). A high value means that the democracy score for the judge’s state is close to the 
democracy score of the applicant. 
 
 
                                                 
34 We use data from Polity IV. 
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Figure 3: Judges’ Votes and Matching Political Systems 
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The figure shows the predicted relationship. Judges from democratic states favor 
riables. 
                                                
democracies over nondemocracies, and judges from nondemocratic states favor 
nondemocracies over democracies.  
 
C. Results 
 
 So far we have limited ourselves to the raw data. The raw data are suggestive but 
of limited value. In this section, we report the results of several regressions. The main 
obstacle for our regressions is multicollinearity: wealth, democracy, language, religion, 
and the various regional groupings are all, to some extent, related—in some cases, with 
correlations as high as 0.5. 35 To address this problem, we run several regressions with 
different groups of independent va
 
35 Another problem is that we run probit regressions and almost all of our independent variables are 
categorical variables. This creates statistical problems that we acknowledge but have no remedy for. We do 
note that one of our independent variables – the wealth measure – is continuous and significant in most of 
the regressions. 
22 
 We use a  Tables 3 and 4 
report two sets of these regressions. Table 3 contains the results of regressions without 
fixed effects; Table 4 contains the results of regressions with judge and case fixed effects.  
The tables contain the standardized coefficients (the marginal probability calculated at 
the mean), the standard errors (in parenthesis), and the value of the z-statistic for each of 
the variables. The dependent variable is 1 if the judge votes in favor of granting the 
applicant relief. Typically, this means that the judge joined the majority or filed a 
concurrence. We do not report the results of regressions with judge fixed effects only and 
with case fixed effects only. These results are largely consistent with the reported 
results.37 
 series of probit models with and without fixed effects.36
                                                 
36 For examples of papers that have relied on variations of this model or that justify its use, see Hausman 
and Wise (1978); Beck et al. (1998); Laisney and Lechter (2002). Wooldridge (2002) suggests that the 
fixed effects probit model has attractive features, but
maximum likelihood for more than about five alternat
 that its main practical drawbacks include obtaining 
ives and the difficulty in obtaining partial effects on 
the response probabilities, which involve complex calculation. Chamberlain suggests that a probit with 
two-way fixed effects can present a number of statistical irregularities. To address these concerns, we test 
nd we reran our regressions holding the sample constant and find consistent results. 
our data with conditional logit models, and find that the results do not have any substantive impact. These 
results are available from the authors. 
37 We also run a series of regressions at the issue level. We find that the results are similar to those 
presented here. A
23 
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Table 3: Probit Estimates with No Fixed Effects
 
 (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6
 pwin  pwin  pwin  pwin  pwin 
applic  0.43  0.38  0.38  0.40  0.31 
  (7.03)*** (5.98)*** (5.07)*** (6.30)*** (4.20)
respon  -0.40  -0.40  -0.35  -0.39  -0.40
  (5.88)*** (5.93)*** (4.77)*** (5.85)*** (5.76)
app-re  -0.17         
       
resp-r  -0.10         
          (2.56)** 
inter-  0.22            0.22 
          (2.52)** 
app-re          0.15
          (3.43)
resp-r o          -0.13
          (2.98)
inter- i          -0.04
          (0.55)
app-la e           
           
resp-l g           
               (1.35) 
inter- a           
               (1.03) 
app-na        -0.03   
           (0.42)   
resp-n         -0.16   
           (3.72)***  
inter-        0.11 
           (1.16)   
democr       0.02 
         (5.95)*** 
ln t    0.11          0.08 
       (4.12)*** 
missin    0.00       
       (0.07)       
Observ s  1437  1437  1090  1437  1437 
Pseudo u 0.06  0.07  0.09  0.06  0.07 
Robust a heses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 
)  (7)  (8) 
 pwin  pwin 
 0.34  0.27 
*** (4.80)*** (2.88)*** 
  -0.37  -0.27 
*** (5.11)*** (2.94)*** 
   -0.12 
   (1.89)* 
   -0.16 
    0.11 
***   (2.22)** 
    0.02 
***   (0.35) 
    -0.15 
    (1.71)* 
 0.24  0.27 
 (4.48)*** (4.13)*** 
 -0.06  -0.01 
 (0.15) 
 -0.11  -0.09 
 (0.64) 
   -0.13 
   (1.56) 
   -0.07 
   (1.16) 
     0.10 
   (0.86) 
       0.01 
      (3.55)*** 
        (2.72)*** 
   -0.01 
   (0.29) 
 1437  1090  
 0.07  0.12 
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ble 4: Probit Estimates with Judge-Case Fixed Eff
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  
   pwin  pwin  pwin  pwin  pwin  pwin  pwin  pwin  
applicant  0.52  0.52  0.52  0.57  0.52  0.51  0.50  0.40 
   (4.67)*** (4.68)*** (4.47)*** (3.73)*** (4.60)*** (3.46)*** (3.44)*** (1.65)* 
respondent  -0.55  -0.55  -0.55  -0.48  -0.55  -0.56  -0.55  -0.45 
   (4.22)*** (4.19)*** (3.87)*** (3.91)*** (3.94)*** (3.89)*** (3.93)*** (2.57)** 
app-region    -0.12            -0.12 
     (1.15)            (0.83) 
resp-region    -0.10            -0.18 
     (1.21)            (1.62) 
inter-region    0.24            0.35 
     (1.67)*           (1.90)* 
app-religion              0.33  0.27 
               (4.40)*** (2.67)*** 
resp-religion              -0.16  -0.02 
               (2.40)**  (0.21) 
inter-religion             -0.11  -0.20 
               (0.84)   (1.21) 
app-language            0.39    0.49 
             (3.93)***   (3.93)*** 
resp-language            -0.10    -0.12 
             (1.04)    (1.09) 
inter-language           -0.45    -0.38 
             (2.65)***   (1.44) 
app-nato          -0.14      -0.32 
           (1.08)       (2.23)** 
resp-nato          -0.18      -0.09 
           (1.70)*      (0.65) 
inter-nato          0.13      0.35 
           (0.72)       (1.77)* 
democracy        0.02        0.01 
         (3.22)***        (1.72)* 
ln per capita gdp     0.13          0.11 
       (2.86)***         (1.99)** 
missing gdp data     0.07          0.02 
       (0.59)          (0.09) 
Observations  1157  1157  1157  836  1157  1157  1157  836  
 Pseudo R-squared 0.48  0.48  0.48  0.46  0.48  0.49  0.49  0.49 
Robust z statistics in parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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k the safest conclusion is that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that judges are 
not biased by NATO and regional matches.41
There are a number of other possible control variables that one 
d War: perhaps judges were more biased during the Cold War when the world was 
more polarized than it is today. (2) Jurisdiction: perhaps judges are less biased when the 
parties appear voluntarily (special agreement) than when one party is a respondent. (3) 
Type of case: perhaps certain types of cases like border disputes are less polarizing than 
others (like use of force), and judges are less biased in the former types of cas
ountry: perhaps judges from certain countries (for example, liberal democracies) 
are less biased than judges from other countries. (5) Applicant and respondent countries: 
perhaps some countries are more or less likely to be the subject of bias because they are 
generally considered good (Sweden) or bad (Libya) world citizens. 
We tested all these possibilities and will not burden the reader with our results.42 
It is sufficient to say that our main results—for applicant and respondent match, for 
democracy, for wealth, and (somewhat weaker) fo
ntrols themselves do not appear to be important.43
 What do these numbers mean? Are the biases we identify trivial or important?  
As we have seen, a judge whose home state does not share a relevant 
characteristic with either the applicant or respondent votes in favor of the applicant with a 
 
41Another possible measure of strategic alignment is trade: it is possible that a judge from a state with good 
trading relations with a party would be more likely to vote for that party. We tried to test this hypothesis 
using data on trade flows, but because the data are relatively recent (post-1962) and partial (excluding 
many states), we don’t have much confidence in regressions. Simple correlations suggest a positive 
voting for the applicant and the 
ositive relationship 
 War voting in the General Assembly shows an East-West cleavage similar to that which 
relationship between a vote for the applicant and variables that measure the relative strength of the trading 
relationship between the judge's state and the applicant. There is a positive relationship, for example, 
between the probability of voting for the applicant and the sum of exports and imports between the judge’s 
state and the applicant; a negative relationship between the probability of 
sum of exports and imports between the judge’s state and the respondent; and a p
between the probability of voting for the applicant and the ratio of exports and imports with applicant over 
exports and imports with respondent (both weighted for judge’s state’s GDP and not). Most of these 
relationships are significant at the 10 percent level but not all of them are.  
42 Available from authors. We did not use case or judge fixed effects because of data limitations. We also 
reran the regressions after dropping all cases involving interveners, multiple applicants, and multiple 
respondents; doing this changes our results only trivially. 
43 Except that the results are somewhat stronger for the Cold War. But there are not enough post-Cold War 
cases for us to determine whether bias has significantly weakened since then. As Voeten (2000, 213) found 
that post-Cold
prevailed during the Cold War, we should be cautious about assuming that the ICJ voting would be 
different. 
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probability of around 0.5. Holding all of the other independent variables at their means, 
the probability of a judge voting in favor of the applicant increases by 27 percentage 
points w
ints when the judge’s 
home s
omic, political, and (somewhat 
ore w —
whethe
 
IV. Conclusion 
he margin, don’t vote impartially in the 
hen the judge and applicant are from the same country; when the judge’s country 
matches the respondent’s country, the likelihood of his voting for the applicant decreases 
by the about same amount. As the democracy variable increases from its minimum to its 
maximum, the likelihood of a judge favoring the applicant increases by 25 percentage 
points. As it increases one standard deviation around the median, the likelihood of 
favoring the applicant increases by 7 percentage points. As the GDP per capita variable 
increases from its minimum to its maximum, the probability that the judge favors the 
applicant increases by 32 percentage points. As it increases one standard deviation 
around the median, the likelihood increases by 5 percentage points. The probability of a 
judge voting in favor of the applicant increases by 24 percentage po
tate’s language is the same as the applicant, compared to the case of no match. But 
the probability is virtually unchanged when the language match is with the respondent. 
The bottom line on the regressions is clear. Judges are biased in favor of their own 
countries, and in favor of countries that match the econ
m eakly) cultural attributes of their own. As for regional and military groupings
r economic or strategic—we are hampered by multicollinearity and lack of 
variation.44
 
The data suggest that national bias has an important influence on the 
decisionmaking of the ICJ. Judges vote for their home states about 90 percent of the time. 
When their home states are not involved, judges vote for states that are similar to their 
home states—along the dimensions of wealth, culture, and political regime. Judges also 
may favor the strategic partners of their home states, but here the evidence is weaker 
because of multicollinearity; if they do, the magnitude of the bias is probably low. 
We have not shown in a straightforward way that judges are consciously biased. 
All that we have shown is that the judges, on t
                                                 
44 As an additional test of our results, we did an in-sample prediction on our probit regression that included 
every variable. We found that our regression coefficients accurately predicted case outcomes 69 percent of 
the time. 
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manner prescribed by the null hypothesis. The motivation for their vote may be 
psychological or cultural; the judges do not necessarily consciously choose to favor a 
state that is strategically aligned with the judges’ own state. 
The evidence also does not prove that the ICJ is dysfunctional, though it gives one 
pause. For one thing, judges may vote dispassionately when the applicant and respondent 
are both very similar to their own state; they may also vote dispassionately when the 
applicant and respondent are both very different from their own state. In these cases, 
there is no reason for the judges to be biased, although they may be outvoted by judges 
who are biased. How often such cases arise is hard to say. 
In addition, even biased judges may sometimes swallow their biases and vote in 
an unbiased manner. Judges who vote 90 percent in favor of their home state vote 10 
percent against their home state, and so in this small fraction of cases they may be voting 
sincerely. It is also possible that they are voting strategically, of course—they may vote 
against their own state on occasion in order to help maintain the appearance of 
imparti
level.45 It may be that states are aware that the ICJ judges are sometimes but 
ot always biased, and that the states are more likely to use the Court and comply with 
they believe that the judgments are not biased. When a state’s own judge 
votes a
states, 
precise
ality. But the possibility of sincere voting in some cases cannot be dismissed on 
the basis of our data set. 
Whether this level of bias matters depends on what the ICJ is supposed to 
accomplish. According to one study, compliance with ICJ judgments hovers around the 
60 percent 
n
judgments when 
gainst his home state, or when judges from a given bloc vote against a party from 
that bloc, it may take the judgment more seriously than otherwise, and be more inclined 
to comply with it. If so, the ICJ may play a useful role, albeit under narrow conditions 
and for limited purposes. 
The founders of the ICJ did anticipate the problem of judicial bias. Some people 
thought that judges should not be allowed to hear cases involving their home 
ly because they feared that such judges could not decide the cases impartially; for 
the same reason, the ad hoc system was anathema. Our evidence vindicates the premise 
                                                 
45 But for doubts, see Posner (2004). 
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of these critics but not their remedy. For our evidence suggests that even nonparty judges 
would be influenced by legally irrelevant factors. 
The designers themselves appeared to think that party judges would ensure that 
each state would get a fair hearing during deliberations. It is certainly possible that judges 
could not be made to understand the claims of a state whose perspective they do not 
share, unless one of their number was a national or representative of that state. Our 
evidence does not reveal whether the cases were decided more impartially than they 
would have been if party judges had been prohibited. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
 Our data set consists of all cases for which there was an opinion on a preliminary 
objectio
observation was dropped. 
 Some cases involved multiple proceedings with separate votes (for example, on a 
preliminary objection and then on the merits). In the reported regressions, we generally 
used the latest proceeding unless it seemed minor (like an interpretive case); but we reran 
our regressions using all the proceedings, and the results differ only trivially. 
 Table A1 contains our main variables with coding and sources. 
n, the merits, or a similarly substantive issue, from the beginning of the ICJ’s 
operations in 1946, through March 1, 2004. For each case, we determine the vote of each 
judge on each issue; whether the judge ultimately sided with one party or the other; and 
whether the judge was a part of the majority, concurrence, or dissent. Records improve 
over time; in a few earlier cases, we could not always answer these questions for a 
particular judge in a particular case, in which case the 
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Table A1: Variable Coding and Sources 
Variables Coding and Sources 
pwin  The dependent variable. Equal to 1 if the judge rules in favor of the applicant; equal to 0 if otherwise. 
applicant Equal to 1 if the applicant’s country and judge’s country match; equal to 0 if otherwise. 
respondent Equal to 1 if the respondent’s country and judge’s country match; equal to 0 if otherwise. 
app-region Equal to 1 if the region of the applicant’s country and the judge’s country are the same. Equal to 0 if otherwise. Regions are defined by individual continents.  
res-region Equal to 1 if the region of the respondent’s country and the judge’s country are the same. Equal to 0 if otherwise. Regions are defined by individual continents. 
inter-region App-region multiplied by res-region. 
ap  NATO; equal to 0 if otherwise. p-nato
ers of Equal to 1 if the respondent’s country and the judge’s country are both memb
res-nato Equal to 1 if the respondent’s country and the judge’s country are both members of NATO; equal to 0 if otherwise. 
inter-nato app-nato multiplied by res-nato 
app-language Equal to 1 if applicant and judge’s state have same majority language; equal to 0 otherwise. 
re age Equal to 1 if respondent and judge’s state have same majority langotherwise. s-langu
uage; equal to 0 
inter-language App-language multiplied by res-language 
app-religion Equal to 1 if applicant and judge’s state have same majority religion; equal to 0 otherwise. 
res-religion Equal to 1 if respondent and judge’s state have same majority religion; equal to 0 otherwise. 
inter-religion app-religion multiplied by res-religion. 
democracy 
Absolute value of the difference between the judge’s state’s democracy score and the 
applicant’s democracy score minus the difference between the judge’s state’s 
democracy score and the respondent’s democracy score. Democracy scores are from 
Polity IV. 
ln per capita 
gdp 
Absolute value of the difference between the judge’s state’s logged per capita GDP and 
the applicant state’s logged per capita GDP minus the difference between the judge’s 
state’s logged per capita GDP and the respondent’s logged per capita GDP. Equal to 0 is 
data is missing. Data comes from the Penn World Tables. The figures are adjusted to a 
1996 base year and adjust for purchasing power parity.  
missing gdp 
data 
Equal to 1 if applicant, respondent, or judge country does not have missing GDP data. 
Equal to 0 if the applicant, respondent, or judge country has missing GDP data. 
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Table A2: Summ ssion Analysis 
Observations Mean Min Max 
ary Statistics for Variables Used in Regre
Variable Std. Dev. 
pwin     1437 0.51 0.50 0 1 
applicant 1560 0.06 0.23 0 1 
respondent 1560 0.06 0.23 0 1 
app-region 1560 0.31 0.46 0 1 
resp-region 1560 0.34 0.47 0 1 
iregion 1560 0.23 0.42 0 1 
ln gdp per cap.  1560 0.02 0.56 -2 2 
missing gdp data 1560 0.49 0.50 0 1 
democracy 1160 -0.89 5.35 -10 10 
app-nato 1560 0.11 0.31 0 1 
resp-nato 1560 0.19 0.39 0 1 
inato 1560 0.07 0.26 0 1 
app-language 1560 0.13 0.33 0 1 
resp-language 0.36 0 1 1560 0.15 
ilang 1560 0.04 0.19 0 1 
app-religion 1560 0.26 0.44 0 1 
resp-religion 1560 0.27 0.44 0 1 
ireligion 1560 0.12 0.33 0 1 
*interaction terms are omitted 
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